Philosophical Lecturing as a Philosophical Practice

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1. In his *Confessions of a Philosopher* (1997) Bryan Magee recommends that every philosopher once in a while should challenge the underlying assumptions shared by philosophers of a given historical period or movement.

One underlying assumption of contemporary academic philosophy is that *philosophy is expressed, should be expressed, and in all essentials can be expressed in a written form*. The contemporary paradigm defines philosophy as an essentially written enterprise.

The bias for the written form has monumental consequences in terms of the themes, issues, vocabularies, and methodologies chosen in conducting philosophy. These consequences go largely unnoticed, however, in academic philosophy, leading to the following drastic outcomes:

1) As philosophy becomes a scholarly activity that operates with texts, specialisation follows, and the broad themes of life and key issues of philosophy of life are dismissed as ‘unscientific’ and fall outside ‘philosophy’.

2) As philosophy is conceived as operating in the written medium, oral communication and oral creativity become marginalized, not forming any critical success factors for the philosopher.

We believe these outcomes trivialize philosophy. Even if a philosophy department may feel obliged to legitimise itself inside the academic setting by imitating other scholarly activities of the modern university institution, the fundamental possibility of philosophy to enhance the actual lives of people is lost - to the loss of both philosophy and the lives of people in general.

2. Socrates wrote nothing, Wittgenstein was extremely reluctant to publish, and Heidegger’s students insist that the true nature of Heidegger’s philosophy could only be captured in his lecturing (Steiner, 1992). These and similar remarks might be used to pinpoint the irreducible and invaluable oral element in philosophy. However, academic philosophy does not agree. The time- and delivery- intensive philosophising styles of a

Wittgenstein are dismissed as anecdotes, not worthy of serious consideration. They are regarded as curiosities, like a comment in a music class that not only was Sibelius a great composer; he had big ears as well.

We believe that something valuable is lost as philosophy is imprisoned and forced into the written format. The *flow* of philosophy, the *conduct* of philosophy in a definite time and space opens up fruitful and explosive possibilities for philosophy as an engaged and generative, reflection- and life-enhancing activity.

Here we welcome Philosophical Practice as it brings back the oral dimension of philosophy. Philosophical counselling, Socratic Dialogue and Philosophy for Children are fundamentally oral practices i.e. take place through spoken language and essentially build upon this. In order to engage in Philosophical Practice, whether as counsellor, counsellee, facilitator or participant you have to engage in a real-time dialogue with other people. Somebody has to speak in order for Philosophical Practice to take place. You have to orient yourself to a communicative, interactive situation defined by the oral medium. *Philosophical Practice, in its essence, is spoken philosophy.*

1 When speaking of Philosophical Practice we refer to the different forms of practical philosophy such as philosophical counselling and Socratic Dialogue. In what follows, we shall also use the concept ‘Philosophical Lecturing’ as the reference to lecturing in the sense elaborated, as opposed to lecturing on philosophy in the traditional academic sense.

2 Most books and articles on Philosophical Practice do not exemplify Philosophical Practice but are meta-level descriptions and analyses of cases and theories of Philosophical Practice. Of course written materials can aim to capture the spirit of Philosophical Practice. When we read modern texts on Philosophical Practice by, say, Achenbach and Schuster we recognise that the texts in questions might contain valuable and incandescent guidelines, advice and hints on Philosophical Practice, and yet the true *practice* of Philosophical Practice points beyond the text format to living dialogue and reflection situated in the real-time counselling session or dialogue.
It is to the advancement of the oral tradition of philosophy, neglected all too long, that we hope to contribute.

3. An ongoing discussion in the Philosophical Practice movement is constituted by meta-questions such as: What is the aim of Philosophical Practice? How should we understand Philosophical Practice as an institution? What are the goals of Philosophical Practice and how do they differ from those of academic philosophy? What is the relationship between Philosophical Practice and therapy?

Philosophical counselling, Socratic Dialogue, Philosophy cafés, Philosophy for Children and Philosophy of Management are typically listed as instances of Philosophical Practice. Common to these efforts is the belief that it makes sense to articulate philosophy outside the academia and without submitting to the rules, imperatives and merit criteria defined by the university institution (Schuster, 1999; Marinoff, 1999; Lahav and Tillmans, 1995; Raabe, 2001. See also Reason in Practice vol. 1-4 and Practical Philosophy vol. 1-5).

At the same time Philosophical Practice endorses a principle we propose calling thematic democracy. Any issue is a potential starting point for a philosophical dialogue, reflection or contribution. What is considered philosophically relevant is not defined by any expert culture of certified philosophers.

The thematic democracy of Philosophical Practice implies that there is a strong anti-segregationist and anti-elitist undercurrent in Philosophical Practice that challenges the hierarchical, elitist and divisional expert culture approach of academic philosophy.

Philosophical Practice also endorses a principle we call dialogical democracy. It does not address representatives of a specific expert culture only, but wants to communicate, connect and dialogue with people at large.

Thirdly, Philosophical Practice differs from academic philosophy in the way it defines the space of its contributive possibilities. It aims to help, inspire, inform, ignite, enrich, deepen and enlighten the people it engages with. Much of this is bound to take place beyond the strictly rational and intellectual acumen of the people in question: Philosophical Practice does not limit itself to a dialogue with the rational side of its interlocutors only. It seeks for human growth in the interlocutors and acknowledges the width and breath of the possibilities of such an enterprise.

With such anti-elitist, anti-segregationist, democratic and growth- and influence-directed basic convictions, Philosophical Practice sharply rejects many of the key assumptions of both the written paradigm of philosophy and academic philosophy.

4. Lecturing is not normally conceived as a major form of Philosophical Practice and is not discussed in the major outlines of Philosophical Practice.³ Our aim is to introduce Philosophical Lecturing explicitly as an independent form of Philosophical Practice alongside with Socratic Dialogue, philosophical counselling and Philosophy for Children.

We suggest that one reason why Philosophical Lecturing has not been acknowledged until now as a form of Philosophical Practice is that in the university context lecturing is conceived as the transmission of knowledge. As an academic institution the university is devoted to producing and organising knowledge and lecturing is a recognised distribution channel of that knowledge. Thus, philosophy, as an academic discipline, will follow suit, and will not assign to lecturing any specific philosophical purposes beyond those of normal content-distribution.

In Philosophical Practice, to be sure, knowledge is of importance but the movement of thought is even more important. It is essential. Personal insight, reflection and fresh internal perspectives are the key. There is an agent-bound, even subjectivistic, core to Philosophical Practice that challenges the objectivistic premises of the academic enterprise.

5.³ In their well-known overviews of the field, neither Shlomit Schuster (1999) nor Lou Marinoff (1999) acknowledge Philosophical Lecturing as a possible form of Philosophical Practice. Ad Hoogendijk recognises that Philosophical Lecturing might be of value in a business setting. However, he seems to allude to traditional lecturing à la academic applied philosophy (Hoogendijk, 1997). Peter Raabe (2001) reviews various standpoints regarding the issue whether Philosophical Counselling is to be understood as teaching or should include teaching. None of these writers aim at legitimating Philosophical Lecturing as a form of Philosophical Practice.
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Shlomit Schuster suggests that the integration of philosophy in all areas of life could be done in philosophy classes in elementary schools, high schools, and at colleges. However, Schuster concludes ‘At present such an elementary philosophical training is lacking worldwide’ (Schuster, 1999, p. 17).

A (tentative) exception is Finland where one philosophy course in high schools is obligatory for all pupils. In addition to this, pupils not belonging to a religious community take part in compulsory courses in ‘philosophy of life’ or ‘outlooks on life’.

Unfortunately, most of the teaching, in spite of the good intentions, amounts to acquiring basic knowledge of the key traditions of philosophy. Philosophy is approached roughly the same way as other subjects such as history of biology, i.e. in terms of the contents the student is supposed to internalise. In most cases Schuster’s objective of ‘the integration of philosophy in solving complex or delicate personal problems’ (Schuster, 1999, p. 17) remains unachieved by the Finnish school system.

The problem here is undoubtedly the assumption that school education should provide the student with appropriate knowledge in the various disciplines being studied, such as philosophy. But suppose we were to reconstruct philosophy as precisely the enterprise the key point of which would be its continuous impact upon the life of the student in terms of enhancing her reflective powers? Suppose philosophy were the name for the never-ending process of examining one’s life reflectively?

The question would then become: what are the most appropriate and effective means to stimulate reflection in people, to the advancement of their examined lives? Focusing on that double target of an examined life and reflection, what are the prospects of Philosophical Lecturing?

Excellent, we propose, in as much as the philosopher perceives her target along the lines already indicated. Everyone cares about what their life ought to be. But in the world of self-help manuals and ready-made answers, within the confines of the liberalism of modern society to choose one’s own way, there are very few forums for inspired, guided, energising internal reflection. Philosophical Lecturing can be such a forum. And, in our view, should be.

In accordance with many philosophical practitioners, we agree that the theme of an examined life should be brought back to the core focus of philosophy. (See for instance Sen (2002) and other contributions in Practical Philosophy vol. 5). An examined life should be the core of all philosophy, not primarily as a theme to be theorised about, but as a theme to be practised by the people of various vocations, as stimulated, inspired and encouraged by the philosopher of the everyday.

The experience of the senior author of this paper is highly encouraging. As a philosopher Esa Saarinen has addressed some 100-150 groups annually since 1990, consisting of homogenous and mixed groups of medical practitioners, businessmen and professionals, teachers and artists, factory workers and white-collar workers, retired people and high school students, people from all walks of life and all adult age groups. In a typical year, Saarinen has addressed some 10,000 people. The interest in these lectures continues to grow, as it has done for over a decade. The typical format has been a lecture of two to three hours, occasionally longer (from one day to a week).

The key is to reintroduce themes of an examined life to people in the context of their actual lives, and to do so in a communicative format accessible to all. The point is to build a reflective context where each is stimulated to engage in a silent dialogue with herself on the broad themes of her life, and do so in the readily understandable format of a lecture.

Saarinen’s experience pays homage to the excellent prospects for Philosophical Lecturing as a contributive platform for the benefit of people in their self-management and for the enhancement of their philosophies of life. Our conclusion is that Philosophical Lecturing can be used successfully for the benefit of people’s lives along the same lines as other forms of Philosophical Practice.

In order to elaborate on some of the key features of the kind of philosophy we seek to promote, we will first examine some aspects of academic philosophy as a text-intensive enterprise.

6.
Jacques Derrida claims that Western philosophy has been ‘phonocentric’, i.e. is centred on ‘voice’ and is deeply suspicious of script. According to Derrida
Derrida’s (1991) brilliant analysis of the ‘literary ruse of the inscription’ suggests fresh perspectives on the whole of Western philosophy. Yet to us, Derrida’s key starting point seems misplaced. For sure, there exists an oral tradition in Western philosophy, and Philosophical Practice can be included in that tradition. But that tradition is marginal. Various features of the functions of the ‘literary object’, ‘inscription’ and ‘the written word’ have undoubtedly been overlooked by Western philosophy but that is a far cry from seeing the oral tradition as dominating the history of Western thinking.

The basis of oral philosophy, as we see it, lies not in nostalgia for an absolute truth, metaphysics of the present or illegitimate authenticity, but in the well-placed desire to make philosophy matter. Inasmuch as philosophy operates in the medium of the oral, in as much as it constitutes itself as something that happens, philosophy connects with the crucial dimensions of communication, interaction and effect.

As opposed to this, Western philosophy, before and after Derrida and including Derrida, represents a deeply rooted bias for the script and for the written word. That bias has been taken to an extreme in modern academic philosophy. However, we believe that the literary bias has contributed to the trivialization of philosophy. The challenge is to find ways of doing philosophy that do not fall into the seductions of the written mode, and re-establish the connection between philosophy and the actual lives of people.

The main features of the written bias in academic philosophy include:

1. Academic philosophers are evaluated by reference to their written work:
   - The most important criteria for filling academic philosophical positions are reviewed articles, books and other publications;
   - The education of philosophers is based on texts, the verified content-internalisation of texts (examinations), and self-written texts (seminar papers, theses, etc.).

2. Academic philosophical lectures, seminars and research focus on texts, and discussions are a meta-activity centred on written material. At philosophical conferences speeches are ‘presentations of papers’ where experts read their well-prepared texts to an audience of other experts. Live thinking is of corrective value only, amounting to last-minute adjustments to the text, with the understanding that those adjustments will shortly be incorporated into the text.

3. In higher education, no form of live philosophy or live philosophising is recognised as a field in which a philosopher can specialize.

Points 1-3 above describes some of the main features of the role of writing in academic philosophy. Growing expertise, specialisation and science-imitation, together with the bias for the written language, amounts to assuming that philosophy becomes alive in the written context only, as a script and string of symbols. Speech does not add anything irreducibly valuable to the conduct of philosophy. It is this trend that Philosophical Lecturing as we conceive it, aims to challenge and revolutionize.

7.

Philosophy in the West is a rational and conceptual enterprise. Should a concept communicate? Should the philosopher’s rational faculty be an isolating force or a force with which to connect to people at large? Academic philosophy, following the lead of sciences, answers: ‘no’. The philosopher’s concepts need not be communicative any more than those of physicist or evolutionary biologist. The rationality of a philosopher need not be a power base for interaction with the average man and woman, any more than that of a scientist.

Consider a classical text of philosophy, such as Plato’s Laches. For an academic philosopher, this is a fairly elementary study of the concept of courage. Plato does

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4 See also Sarup (1993).

5 Philosophy, understood in the academic text-centred sense has a long tradition. For instance, Giorgio Colli, in his La nascita della filosofia traces the birth of philosophy as written discipline to the moment when Plato detaches philosophy from practical matters in his writings (Colli, 1985). Plato’s opposition to the Sophists is one aspect of the duality between spoken and written philosophy. The Sophists’ method linked abstract reasoning to the empirical by speech and is condemned by Plato as seduction in the manner of Orpheus. And of course Plato further thought that the truth is independent of the thinker or the mode of presentation. Plato, the rationalist and objectivist, committed himself to writing, doing that superbly as a great dramatist. See Guthrie, W.K.C. (1971) and Sternberger, R.J. (ed.) (1990).
his best, and Socrates in the dialogue does his best, but in terms of the conceptual analysis depicted, with minor success. Plato, or the Socrates of the text, does not have the conceptual results at his disposal that have been produced by generations of philosophers after them; hence the primitive level of their efforts.

But suppose Plato and Socrates succeed - in exemplifying the practice of philosophy. Suppose Plato’s Laches is not an example of conceptual analysis but an example of philosophising. And suppose that those philosophising are the philosopher Socrates and his non-philosopher companion Laches.

For us, this is the primary reading of Plato’s Laches and for us this is what philosophy is all about. Philosophy is a practice, and a practice open to all. Its subject theme: the examination of life. For us, the success of Socrates in the dialogue lies not in his ability to demonstrate that Laches the war hero does not know what courage is - but in leading Laches the war hero to reflect on a key element in his life, courage.

Socrates, thus conceived, is a genius in making a person reflect and engage in internal dialogue. In the words of Nicias, one of Plato’s characters:

Don’t you know that whoever approaches Socrates closely and begins a dialogue with him, even if he begins by talking about something entirely different, nevertheless finds himself forcibly carried around in a circle by this discourse, until he gets to the point of having to give an account of himself - as much with regard to the way he is living now, as to the way he has lived his past existence. (Plato, Laches 187e)

Such persuasive powers, such marketing skills for philosophical reflection, are not in much demand in modern academic philosophy, however. This is because conceptual analysis is for the benefit of a community of experts, rather than the analysis of life for the benefit of people. There is no particular need for this conceptual analysis to communicate.

Suppose a layman talking with a philosopher, unlike the war hero Laches, does not get excited by the chance to reflect on courage. Socrates in the dialogue manages to get Laches to dialogue about courage and to ponder upon it, but suppose a present day philosopher, in all his scholarship, is less successful. The academic philosopher’s lack of success would hardly be surprising, given his training, background and the criteria of merit of his academic environment. If somebody is not interested in the conceptual analysis of courage, then so much the worse for her. It is not the philosopher’s problem if a layperson cannot relate to what he presents. Tuning in to an audience is not considered a particularly relevant part of a philosopher’s professionalism. It suffices to be an expert, and an expert in any field is not likely to be a master in communicating his deepest insights to non-experts.

Is courage an excellence of a dignified life? The Greeks thought so, and consequently devoted much time and effort to dwell on that cardinal virtue. The stance of modern academic philosophy is different. Courage does not matter, only the concept of courage does, including everything that has been written about it. The focus is on the concept of courage and the texts generated upon that theme. None of that need to relate in any way to the potential courage in the lives of anyone. As the philosopher lectures on the notion of courage in Plato’s dialogue Laches, the students take notes in order to internalise the relevant conceptual distinctions and in order to take one further step towards becoming a part of the academic community. None of this has anything to do with their own courage.

We consider this outcome as absurd. It highlights how far academic philosophy has come from its Socratic origins. We should return to the ancient promise of philosophy, where philosophy relates to the lives of all.6

8.
Modern lecturing on philosophy mirrors the disciplinary standards of academic philosophy. As a scholarly enterprise philosophy cannot start from scratch. Like any other discipline it builds its own ever more segregated and specialised tradition. The philosopher engages with a dialogue but the dialogue is defined as a highly restricted area - to a dialogue with other experts and with the texts recognised as relevant in the given problem area. Concerns of non-experts, and the concerns of experts themselves in the context of their actual lives, are pushed aside, downplayed and marginalized, as the specialised enterprise of philosophy attempts to act as an

academically credible philosophy-science. In that effort, the impersonality of academic philosophy is considered to be major achievement. Even if philosophy could not be an objective science, at least it can pretend it is.

However, humanly relevant dialogue on the life of a person can hardly be restricted to an objective language only. In Charles Taylor’s words, ‘We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression’ which includes the ‘languages of art, of gesture, of love, and the like’ (Taylor, 1991, p. 33). Some form of subjectivism and some discourse of personal experience will have to be allowed for if philosophy wants to communicate and promote internal dialogue.

9. Contemporary academic philosophers are well aware of the gap between people's practical needs and the scholastic and exegetical character of academic philosophy. At the conference of Institute International de Philosophie in Helsinki in 1996, one academic philosopher expressed his worries in this way.

Humans continue to have philosophical needs, but as philosophers have abdicated their roles as providers, others have taken over; cosmologists, physicists, biologists, ecologists, economists, journalists and new age cranks, all have entered the fray with enthusiasm and naiveté. The problem is that their contributions do not add up to an integrated, coherent and reliable worldview. To achieve that integration in a clear and rational way would be the task of philosophy. But this task remains unfulfilled. The philosophy we are looking for remains to be done. (Mosterin in Knuuttila and Niiniluoto, 1996, p. 160)

At the same conference many similar concerns were articulated. The proceedings of the seminar contain numerous calls by eminent academic philosophers for the importance and necessity of applied philosophy. However, many of the calls end with a sceptical view of the possibility to meet the call, if not with plain resignation.

Much of this pessimism is undoubtedly due to the philosopher's assumption that 'applied philosophy' will have to follow the path of applications in other fields of 'pure basic research'. After generating philosophical insights, theories and conceptual distinctions in your basic research, you go on to apply the pure stuff to the impurities of the real world. But are your applied notions likely to be of much interest to the general public, the media or to your children? Most probably not. Thus you might conclude: better stick with the basic research where at least you can build on your academic reputation with articles that the select few read.

We believe that philosophy as a whole should start with the practical, as indeed it once did. How to live a life? What is good for a human being, what is good for me? These are practical questions, and should be approached as such. Furthermore, the full significance of any philosophy of life is always tested in real life, in contexts that are concrete and ambiguous, accidental and fluctuating, intellectually unclear and charged with emotions, hopes, agonies and frustrations. Thus a crucial issue for a person to reflect upon might take the form - should I speak up to the person who is bullying my colleague, or not? Should I quit excessive drinking and stop pretending it does not affect my behaviour? Do I have the courage? While a problem to which a person is hooked might not be acknowledged as sufficiently abstract to warrant a status in academic philosophy, a philosophy that wants to contribute to the internal dialogue of a person facing this particular problem, cannot dismiss that very issue. If philosophy wants to take seriously its call for enhancement of the internal reflection of people, in the service of their examining their lives, it will find worth pondering and facing as relevant any issue that a person claims as such. Anything goes - as long as it bears on the essential problems of life of the people the philosopher engages in a dialogue with.

10. Philosophy, Pierre Hadot argues forcefully in his outstanding Philosophy as a Way of Life, was intended, first and foremost, to form people and to transform souls (Hadot, 1995; 2002). Hadot shows forcefully that the ancient view of philosophy linked that enterprise with the fundamental quest for a life worth living, to the cultivation of the soul, the way of life of each human being. Philosophy was focused on the internal possibilities of people, on the transformation of one's personal vision of the world and the improvement of one's life. Thus, the ancient philosopher did not primarily aim at the transmission of knowledge but was concerned with affecting the listeners in their very way of life. This involved more than a reciting of abstract knowledge, however well researched.

Hadot points out that in antiquity philosophical theory was not considered an end in itself. Here a modern textbook reading of antiquity easily leads to major misconceptions. Against the assumed privilege of
The ancient philosophical approach focused on a pursuit of transformation and inner dialogue, excelling through this. ‘To emerge victorious from this battle, it is not enough to disclose the truth’, Hadot writes. ‘What is needed is persuasion, and for that one must use psychagogy, the art of seducing souls. Even at that, it is not enough to use only rhetoric, which, as it were, tries to persuade from a distance, by means of continuous discourse. What is needed above all is dialectic, which demands the explicit consent of the interlocutor at every moment.’ (1995, p. 92)

We believe Hadot’s call for a ‘persuasive’, ‘psychagogical’ and ‘dialectical’ philosophy which in the words of Plato’s Apology goes up to all people ‘persuading you to care for virtue’, is timely and essential.

11. How seriously should a philosopher as a philosopher take his own spouse, ageing father, a neighbour, a stranger in the street, her teenage daughter, people in general? How seriously, as a philosopher, should she take her own life? Is everyday life worth the philosopher’s philosophical attention?

For academic philosophy, the answer is clear: overlook your neighbours, the immediate concerns of people, and focus on the ideas, forms, ideals, arguments, concepts and selected text materials that your privileged expert culture acknowledges as the only ones worthy of a serious man’s full attention. Because of their lack of training, ordinary people and indeed all people outside the philosopher-expert’s domain of expertise are marginalized, as interlocutors of a genuine philosophical dialogue.7

We believe otherwise. Philosophy should start with the concerns of people irrespective of their background, and aim at a contribution within the life projects of those people. That contribution does not aim at hammering through a particular answer. Philosophy is the art of reflection, not the high preacher of ultimate answers. As Gerd Achenbach puts it,

‘We are not supposed to say how he (the client) should live, but we are asked to make him get to know himself and his own way of living, that is to enlighten himself about himself as far as possible.’ (1998, p. 15)

In order to promote reflection, philosophy must start from scratch and acknowledge the grandeur of that humble beginning. This is the lesson from Laches, we believe - and the lesson of most of the dialogues of Plato. Socrates meets someone, and philosophising begins. The aim of philosophy is to help the average person to examine her ways of perceiving, conceptualising and acting in the world.

A concerned mother, going with her family on a summer vacation, consults the family doctor on the dangers of sunlight on children’s skin. She also studies the accompanying instructions of a suntan lotion carefully. She successfully instructs her husband and children on how to apply the lotion. Does she contribute anything to the science of physiology? No. She acts as a mother, she cares for her loved ones. But should she start to reflect upon the fundamentals of her life, examining her views and turning them over, perhaps as a result of talking to an inspiring philosopher in the plane to the vacation resort, she would philosophise.

Bryan Magee (1997) suggests that anyone intelligent enough and with a will to understand philosophical problems can take part in discussing and investigating philosophically. This is fine, but insufficient. Who is to judge whether a client, counsellee or an audience is intelligent enough for ‘philosophical reflection’? To us it is the task of the philosopher to get people in the right mode to reflect, to mesmerise people - whoever they might be - with personally-relevant life themes that call for internal dialogue, there and then.

12. Lecturing differs from the established forms of Philosophical Practice in the apparent primacy and sovereignty of the philosopher. In the lecture context, the lecturing philosopher is typically the sole source of speech and the situation unfolds with her in command. Lecturing is a lecturer-centred enterprise, and seems to marginalize the creative impact and contribution of the audience.

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7 For a critical discussion of some of the features of academic philosophy from a different perspective, see Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies: Media Philosophy, 1994.
However, a closer look reveals that Philosophical Lecturing can be articulated as a fruitful form of Philosophical Practice. Let us put aside the idea of the lecturer as an authority delivering a ready-made message - and instead focus on the lecture situation as a performing art context where the philosopher takes the stage in order to enhance orally, conceptually and verbally the reflective mode in the audience, undoubtedly also using her personal credibility and charm. Surely there is nothing but the philosopher's imagination and creative talents to stop her from achieving the reflective breakthroughs that Philosophical Practice is after.

While contemplating the core of Philosophical Practice, Achenbach describes reflection as the foundation of Philosophical Practice:

[A reason why Nietzsche] is a model for Philosophical Practice is his saying that life with all its vagueness is the primary substance on which all philosophical reflection follows only as a second. His maxim could be summarised as follows: Not living as it is thought philosophically, but thinking over philosophically that which is lived (Achenbach, 1998, p. 14).

Can Philosophical Lecturing help an audience to ‘think over philosophically that which is lived’? Obviously the answer is positive. To be sure, not many philosophers reach that objective but we believe that is due to a dramatically misplaced strategy on the part of philosophers. The objectives of the philosophical effort have been misplaced and a forceful cultural bias has pointed the philosopher to themes, issues and methodologies, communicative practices and discourse languages that have trivialized philosophy and alienated it from the concerns of people, from life experience and the actual conduct of life. As ‘that which is lived’ has become trivialized by professional philosophy, so have the wider possibilities of Philosophical Lecturing also been liquidated.

But suppose we want to hold on to the kind of philosophy Hadot identifies in the Ancient, to philosophy that focuses on the enhancement of reflection in people for the benefit of their own lives. What are the prospects of Philosophical Lecturing in that setting? They are superb - especially if the philosophical lecturer fully takes advantage of the possibilities of the stage. The better the philosopher's stage presence, the more mesmerizing her approach and the more astonishing the lines of thought she develops, the more effective it is likely to be.

A philosophical performing artist, a live show philosopher, will undoubtedly put aside scholarly concerns and focus on what works. The lecturer’s aim is to trigger and aid reflection in the participant, rather than present philosophical discoveries and theories as objectively as possible. We are talking about a performance, not of the distribution channel of specific content-material.

A performance requires an audience. The audience has rights, indeed major rights, mostly unheard of in the academic context where even the customer-perspective is new and revolutionary.² The audience of a performance has the right to vote with its feet. The performer, far from being a sovereign, will have to meet the audience and establish a relationship, a contract, to the effect that she can start and continue. The audience, every performer knows, can be cruel and bloodthirsty. You may have to get off the stage all beaten and in bruises. Your scholarship and theoretical knowledge will not help, nor any of the references you may have on CV. Your only chance is to make the performance work at that particular moment.

These considerations indicate the kind of challenges a performing philosopher will have to deal with. The philosopher, as a performing artist, will face the same agonies and possibilities as any professional of that genre.² She needs to sell her case at this particular moment; she needs to mesmerize the audience in spite of their reservations and low level of energy; she needs to build the drama there and then; she cannot rely on past successes. Most importantly, she cannot rely on a text, however ingenious in its own right. A performance will have to be performed - by the philosopher.

Real-time live philosophy is a performing art, for the benefit of the audience and their personal reflection, with the requirement for the philosopher to be able to deliver the lines of thought that work in the given context. So what are the most crucial points for the philosophical lecturer to have in mind, bearing in mind that Philosophical Lecturing is a performing art? To begin with:-

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² On the customer perspective in college education, see Ernie LePore and Sarah-Jane Leslie, 2002.

² For an illuminating study of some of the issues involved, see Glenn D. Wilson, The Psychology of Performing Arts, 1994.
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The lecture focuses thematically on the question of the good life and other grand issues of life (the philosopher-performer as a philosopher of life);

The lecture aims at the enhancement of real-time reflection on their own lives by the people in the audience (reflection-intensity of the performance);

The lecture focuses on questions, suggestions and possibilities, aimed at triggering thinking rather than on advice or ready solutions (Philosophical Lecturing as a thought-provoking rather than pastoral activity);

The lecture aims at personal impact and subjective insight (the philosopher-performer seeks to touch people as individual human beings);

The lecture enhances systems intelligence in the listener by making her aware of the different humanly relevant systems that she belongs to, seeing their impact upon her behaviour and her own impact upon the power of the system. The idea is to highlight the systems of interconnectedness and the complex feedback loops in an individual's philosophy of life.\(^\text{10}\)

The lecture uses generally understandable standard language (universal accessibility of the discourse used);

The lecture uses intuitively accessible conceptual means and relies on reasoning in its unfolding (rationality of the philosophical enterprise);

The lecture acknowledges the themes of an examined life as essentially holistic, integrated and interconnected, and therefore does not categorically rule out any feature or dimension of life as a priori irrelevant (thematic holism of the philosophy of life);

The lecture acknowledges the lecture participant as a complete human being with a multitude of facets, observing that her emotional, imaginary and associative capacities will form a base for potential reflection along with her more strictly rational capacities (multi-layered approach to promoting reflection);

The lecture will be subjected to general criteria of performance success (the performance nuances of the Philosophical Lecture).

Some less obvious yet crucial consequences of such a conception of philosophy include:

1. The style of presentation, way of speaking, tone of voice, body language, image, personal credibility, humour and guts will play a key role in the philosopher-performer's potential success;

2. The philosopher is likely to need major skills of compassion, the power to live her part in front of a live audience, and to rely on her intellectual brilliance to only a limited extent;

3. Any written material will have a secondary role at best;

4. Improvisation skills of the philosopher-performer will be crucial; she will have to have skills to think real thoughts on the stage and feel real feelings on the stage;\(^\text{11}\)

5. The philosopher must acknowledge that she is in the business of influencing and will have to have an ethical stand regarding how far to go;

6. In many cases, whatever works on the stage, is right on the stage;

7. The effort of the performing philosopher is communal in nature; the performance and its atmosphere are created together with the live audience;

8. The philosopher will put herself on the line; as a performer of lines of thought on the grand themes of an examined life, she will have to show those themes credibly in her own way of being and life;

9. Performance merits and stage brilliance will be a key element in the impact of the philosopher as a lecturing artist.

Reflection on ‘that which is lived’ is a highly personal enterprise. The aim of Philosophical Lecturing is to enhance that process. It can only succeed by first establishing a rapport with the hearer - personal credibility is of the essence. Here the situation is similar to many other forms of Philosophical Practice where the personal credibility of the philosopher is fundamental.

We have argued that Philosophical Lecturing, in its concern for the good life of the customer-client and its ability to create an inner dialogue and reflection about issues of the everyday can be described as a form of Philosophical Practice. But what value is added by an inner dialogue and by reflection? Our answer to this question will aim at a contribution to the often-heated debate amongst philosophical practitioners about what the benefit of the different forms of Philosophical Practice are or should be.

\(^{10}\) Systems Intelligence, a concept developed in the research team of Raimo P. Hämäläinen and Esa Saarinen at Helsinki University of Technology, Systems Analysis Laboratory. See http://www.systemsintelligence.hut.fi and Systemiäly! (in Finnish), Bäckström & al. (eds) Systems Analysis Laboratory Research Reports B23, April 2003.

\(^{11}\) For illuminating discussions of improvisation, see Stephen Nachmanovitch, 1990 and Derek Baily, 1992.
In describing himself as a ‘midwife’, Hadot points out, Socrates emphasises that he ‘himself knows nothing and teaches nothing, but is content to ask questions; and it is Socrates’ questions and interrogations which help his interlocutors to give birth to ‘their’ truth.’ (Hadot, 2002, p. 27). But how do people give birth to their truths? Highly idiosyncratically, for one thing. A person’s perspective on life is a function of a whole array of interpretations, beliefs, assumptions and mental models subjectively entertained by her. Philosophical Lecturing, aiming at an inner dialogue, will have to take place vis-à-vis that highly subjective, emotionally charged and associatively rich dimension. The contribution of a philosophical lecture stimulating a person’s inner dialogue on her life will vary from person to person and will not submit to any straightforward linear logic.

This is our first point. The second point is that instead of creating any well-defined and definite outcome, the philosophical lecture will create a seedbed for future growth, transformations and change and will therefore be sowing in nature. Philosophical Lecturing seeks for an emergent contribution growing from within, as people’s lives unfold. We would like to describe the contribution of Philosophical Lecturing, and of Philosophical Practice more generally, by suggesting that it is typically unpredictable, idiosyncratic and emergent in nature.

Thus, attempts to submit Philosophical Lecturing and Philosophical Practice at large to narrowly specified goals seems to us misplaced. In the context of a physiological illness, specific goal setting is often appropriate but not so in the context of philosophy, which aims at enhancing people’s inner dialogue on the fundamentals of their lives.

13.

During the course of a Philosophical Lecture, one person might be impressed by a particular story, concept or line of thought, or simply by the way the line is delivered by the performing philosopher. The next person might not be touched, as she might be preoccupied with something that happened at the office two hours earlier. But the lecture continues and the performance is not yet at its conclusion. More follows - and if the performer is sufficiently engaging, she will ultimately hold everyone’s attention even when the person initially does not really grasp the significance of what is being elaborated, or fails to link a story with anything personal.

Where a philosophical counsellor works with individual forms of reflection, mental models, assumptions etc. a performing philosopher will typically work with a multitude of such. The performing philosopher will have very little explicit knowledge regarding the ways of thinking or ways of life of the people in the audience. Like a performing artist she will have to be able to read the audience quickly and instinctively, applying skills that go deep into the intuitive and emotional dimension.

The performing philosopher will need particular sensibilities in order to carry out her mission. Situational awareness will be a useful skill. The instinctive sense for the vacillating real-time situation will provide the performing philosopher data of crucial significance. She will not only think in front of a live audience but will also sense what the audience thinks. Approaching the situation as an artist, she will be able to deliver the lines of thought, stories and punch lines, what Plato called ‘brief and memorable words’ (Protagoras, 343a-b), the breaks and the rhythm and the punctuation, in a way that will induce the listeners to open themselves up for a rewarding inner dialogue, not just immediately but also afterwards. Like any engaging performer, she will have to have a sense for the emotional energies in the lecture room and be ready for the opportunities those energies open up moment by moment.

Mezirow defines a ‘meaning perspective’ as ‘a general frame of reference, set of schemas, worldview, or personal paradigm’. A meaning perspective involves a set of psychocultural (e.g. social norms, cultural and language codes, ideologies, theories), psychological (e.g. repressed parental prohibitions which continue to block ways of feeling and acting, personality traits) and epistemic (e.g. learning, cognitive and intelligence styles, sensory learning preferences, focus on whole parts) codes (Mezirow, 1995, p. 42). In order to challenge the meaning perspectives of the listener the performing philosopher will have to have some feel of the general meaning perspectives as well as many of the specific meaning perspectives represented in the audience. She will have to be able to do this at the same time as the lecture is progressing, and, in most cases, without anyone saying anything.

12 On situational awareness, as explicated in an apparently unrelated and yet illuminating context, see Mike Spick, The Ace Factor: Air Combat and the Role of Situational Awareness, 1988.
Twentieth century academic philosophy found its allies in science, especially mathematics and linguistics but also in physics, biology and sociology. In Philosophical Practice the borderlines have been pushed much further. Not being content with the limitations of scientific and humanistic research, philosophical counselling finds its allies in pragmatically engaged broadly ratio-based activities such as therapy and pastoral counselling. The practice of Socratic dialogue finds itself sharing techniques with fields such as family therapy, Bohmian dialogue techniques and some techniques developed for Senge-inspired learning organizations (See for instance Bohm, 1996; Dixon, 1998; Isaacs, 1999; Senge, 1991; Senge, 1994). In this paper we suggest that Philosophical Practice, when approached through Philosophical Lecturing, will introduce to us as allies from the performing arts.

A. Traditional Lecture - Underlying theory:

Text-based theory

Lecture, philosophy from above

Learning, internalising

Ordinary thinking, daily behaviour, values

B. Philosophical Lecturing - Underlying theory:

Personal reflection, empirical understanding and texts

Lecturing as performing

Inner dialogue, reflection

Everyday thinking, behaviour, goals and values

Figure 1. A comparison of traditional and philosophical lecturing

In Philosophical Lecturing a philosophical practitioner cannot rely solely on a speech, based on research of texts, written in solitude. That is the business of the traditional lecturer whose speech is simply a distribution channel for a selected content material. The philosophical practitioner will most likely make use of notes but those are likely to be based on personal experiences, stories and various mnemonic devices intended to help the philosopher recall what he wanted to say in the performance situation.

However, the performing philosopher must act out his ideas and speech delivery in accordance with the nature of the situation. This is reminiscent of the effort of a philosophical counsellor who, as Achenbach puts it, ‘is there to listen’, and in order to achieve that, needs to grasp the counsellee’s unique situation. In the same manner, the performing philosopher must tune in and listen to the unique features of the particular audience she is presently dealing with. She is there to listen - in order to be able to talk successfully. The ability to be sensitive to the unique individuality of the client, and the ability to mirror back this perception, are of central dialectical importance in all forms of Philosophical Practice and also in Philosophical Lecturing as a performance art.

Listening and being sensitive to others is hard. The philosopher-performer must manage both. She needs to adapt in real-time to the movements of thought of her audience, in order to guide those thoughts to rewarding and personally uplifting examinations of life. This calls for major adaptation skills and improvisation skills, talents of the kind not required or particularly appreciated in the academic context.

The academic philosopher takes pains to document his thoughts in writing. When taking the stage in a conference he acts as a historian of his own thoughts. He is like a pop singer who presents his songs by playback. Contrary to this, the performing philosopher composes her work, adopts it and interprets her work when performing live on the stage. The interpretation is as important as the initial idea, often more important, as everything hinges on whether the idea becomes alive there and then for the particular people that are attending the lecture.

The performing philosopher should think real thoughts and feel real feelings on the stage, to borrow the words of Judith Weston, in her well known guidebook for theatre directors (Weston, 1996). The performing philosopher, like any stage performer, needs to have presence. For that she needs thoughts, and courage to engage in them in front of a live audience.

Examples used in academic philosophy are mostly fictitious and highly eccentric from the point of view of the everyday experience of most people. The examples
used rarely reflect the lecturer's personal experience. A philosopher might use a personal anecdote to lighten up an otherwise downbeat philosophical lecture but such a demonstration of personal experience is readily perceived not to carry genuine philosophical value. Contrary to Philosophical Practice, traditional academic philosophy is a theoretical enterprise and proud of it. It does not seek to connect with anyone's personal experience, not even with the personal experience of the philosopher himself.

The examples a philosopher uses undoubtedly reflect his aims. If a case is theoretical, so are the examples. Examples are illustrations, in an effort that is fundamentally non-empirical.

But if philosophy wants to encourage, stimulate and seduce people to reflect upon their lives, and do so irrespective of their background, the whole methodology of examples must be renewed. If we want to lighten people up, surely we want to have examples that people can relate to. Indeed we believe examples, case studies and story lines are the key to successful Philosophical Lecturing as a performing art. Philosophy, on stage, is a narrative art form.

It has been pointed out by several scholars that the narrative structure has a particular appeal for the human mind. A performing philosopher should make use of this possibility in order to stimulate reflection.

A particularly useful category of stories is those where the performer herself is a privileged authority: concrete events regarding which the philosopher-performer has personal experience and first-hand knowledge. The use of personal examples has several advantages. By presenting cases from her own life the philosopher implicitly serves as an example of a person reflecting on one's own life. Real life examples also prevent nit-picking. The philosopher might present general philosophical ideas but not per se - rather as embedded in the context of concrete everyday experience (arguments with one's spouse, moments of happiness with one's children, staggeringly stupid misjudgements, etc.) She reflects on the stage her own life and its tragedies, delights and agonies, presenting new points to herself. She is leading herself to an insight, and thereupon to potential change, and if successful, she might manage to induce the participants to attempt the same. People in the audience might identify with someone in the story, or associatively end up thinking of a similar case of one's own.

The use of examples and concrete life histories will make abstract principles, values and larger-than-life ideas more concrete, accessible and personally touching. In philosophy as a performing art, examples are not only used to illustrate philosophical reasoning but to serve as a source and stimulation of philosophical reasoning itself. The idea is to lead the participant to examine her life and to reflect upon it, representing the philosophical mode Hadot identifies with the philosophical effort of antiquity and with the Achenbachian core of Philosophical Practice.

17. We believe Philosophical Lecturing is a particularly fruitful platform for reflection for a reason that goes easily unnoticed.

As the philosopher is having a seeming monologue there is no need for the audience to take a stance. The participant is released from taking a stand - and therefore might start to consider views that she might otherwise bypass or instinctively avoid. As there is no need to go public, there is a good chance that she will go private.

In the context of hundreds of lectures, Saarinen has experienced the phenomenon we are referring to. The philosopher goes to talk to a group of high-flying managers and is instructed that ‘this is a very active group’. ‘They love interaction.’ But as Saarinen finishes three hours later, everyone sits in deep silence. The participants have found it more rewarding to focus on their own innermost thoughts than to demonstrate their intellectual sharpness to others in the room.

In a lecture context, the participant need not share her thoughts with anyone but herself. Therefore, the participant will have a chance to ponder themes that might be sensitive and alternatives that she might not want to reveal to others she is even considering as options.

The lecture context, rightly realized, will enhance the possibilities of an internal dialogue, because there is no need for a public dialogue. The creation and the evoking of philosophical reflection is what philosophy as a performing art is all about. We might speak of a

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13 See e.g. the groundbreaking work of Jerome Bruner in The Culture of Education, 1996, as well as the landmark studies of Howard Gardner, e.g. Leading Minds, 1995.
Philosophical Lecturing as a Philosophical Practice

Esa Saarinen and Sebastian Slotte

What should be recognised is that in the human predicament reason and emotion are interconnected. That being the case, the emotion-directed aspects of performing arts are a natural power base for bringing forth philosophical reflection. In her landmark study on the philosophy of emotions Martha Nussbaum summarises her position by saying that 'emotions are appraisals or value judgements' that deal with the 'person's own flourishing'. The view ‘contains three salient ideas: the idea of a cognitive appraisal or evaluation; the idea of one’s own flourishing or one’s important goals and projects; and the idea of the salience of external objects as elements in one’s own scheme of goals.’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p.4)

Our aim in this paper has been to suggest that Philosophical Lecturing should be perceived as a form of Philosophical Practice, to the benefit of a person’s cognitive appraisals of her life, of her own flourishing and important goals and projects.¹⁴

Genuine questioning and wonder does not amount to potential intellectual re-evaluation only. It runs deeper and will have momentum that shakes the foundations of the wonderer’s whole way of being. This is the effect of Socrates who in Theaetetus says of himself, ‘I am utterly disturbing (atopos), and I create only perplexity (aporia)’. (Theaetetus,149a).

Magic in the air?
‘This is part of the tradition of music’, Jerry Garcia of the Grateful Dead explains when discussing some of the key experience with one of the greatest live bands of rock music. ‘A magic of one sort or another.’ ‘It’s sort of stumbling into this area where there’s a lot of energy and a lot of something happening and not a lot of control. So that the sense of individual control disappears and you are working at another level entirely.’ ‘Things just flow. It’s kind of hard to report but it’s a real thing.’ ‘It’s reported back to us by people in the audience too so this is one of those things where we’re sort of collecting data without really knowing quite where it’s leading or what it’s all about but we

¹⁴ The ethics of personal reflection we propose is inspired by and builds on the some important notions in virtue ethics. Bernard Williams (1987) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) both argue against the impossibility and impotence of those contemporary trends in ethics and public discussion of ethics that restrict ethics to a remaking of the world at large, thus undermining individual attempts to strive for improvement, virtue and the good life. Attempts that all in all contribute to the improvement of society as a whole.
feel a certain custodian relationship to it. It's not something that we've creating exactly, in a way it's creating us.’ (Bailey, D. 1992, p. 42-3).

A philosopher letting go of her control, in order to create something together with others, through ‘a kind of custodian relation’, ‘without really knowing quite where it’s leading’, in order to allow the situation itself to flow and create?

Performing, live philosophy - for the benefit of ordinary people, reflection and the improvement of one’s life.

**Appendix: Case Comments and feedback from Esa Saarinen’s Philosophical Lecturing**

Philosophical Lecturing as a form of Philosophical Practice, along the lines elaborated in this paper, is based on the experiences of Esa Saarinen’s style of lecturing. Since the late 1980’s Saarinen has developed an approach to lecturing on philosophy based on the ideas we have attempted to systematize in this article.

As in Philosophical Practice in general, Philosophical Lecturing is primarily praxis and action. Any theory or metadescription, while interesting in its own right, is secondary. The merits of a Philosophical Lecture should be judged on the basis of its concrete usefulness. The life-and-death question is: Does the Philosophical Lecture work the way it is supposed to work? Does the lecture create movement of thought in the minds of the participants? Is internal dialogue regarding fundamental themes of life enhanced? These questions pertaining to the pragmatic effects of the lecture are fundamental and remain fundamental even if we could not explain just why a Philosophical Lecture functions in practice in creating the relevant kind of effects. In the article we outline some general guidelines for Philosophical Lecturing and provide a framework for a meta-level conceptualisation of it. But it should be kept in mind that the true value of Philosophical Lecturing can only be evaluated on the basis of its pragmatic worth, rather than on the basis of the merits or failings of a meta-level description of it.

We shall return to a more empirically oriented study of Saarinen’s lecturing techniques and their impact in a separate work. Here we shall indicate some features of the effects of that approach. They are submitted by way of an illustration only.

**Example 1**

Esa Saarinen undertook a series of lectures on ‘Philosophy and systems thinking’ at The Helsinki University of Technology Spring 2001 (seven lectures, each lasting three hours). The lectures were open to all and not compulsory for anybody. A highly heterogeneous group of some 300 people followed the course, most of them undergraduate and graduate students but the audience also included post-doctoral researchers, staff, and people from outside the University. Each lecture focused on a classical philosopher (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle etc.) and mirrored the classical philosopher with respect to Peter Senge’s ‘systems thinking’ and ‘five disciplines’. As a third key element, Saarinen used his own life and illustrative concepts throughout in elaborating the themes. After each lecture Saarinen prepared a questionnaire on an internet site with questions intended to deepen the personal experience of the participants of the themes discussed. Open comments were encouraged, and some were read out by Saarinen at the beginning of each lecture. The questionnaire served a triple purpose: to enhance the internal dialogue of the lecture participant, to give the lecturer feedback on each lecture, and to create an instrument of interaction for the lecturer and the audience. Grades were passed on the basis of ‘reflection papers’, essays in which the participants were invited to apply some of the themes, concepts and approaches of the series to aspects of their life or personal experience.

**Examples of the internet questions (followed by results).**

*When I make decisions about my own life and engage in inner philosophical dialogue, my thinking is best described as:*  
Clear and bright 0,  Intuitive 20,  Controlled 1,  Systematic 3,  Holistic 13,  Mechanic 2,  Extensive 8,  Thorough 15,  Analytic 10,  Insecure and probing 19,  Secure and certain 1.  (Total no of answers : 92)

*Esa Saarinen’s concrete examples were from my point of view:*  
Very enlightening 49,  Enlightening to some extent 53,  Enlightening in a small scale 11,  Did not touch me 2,  I don’t know 2.  (Total no of answers : 117)
Applied Philosophy as a part of the curriculum at the Helsinki University of Technology is:
Very Important 67,
Important to some extent 32,
Not very important 10,
Not important at all 3,
I don’t know 5.   (Total no of answers : 117)

One of the main themes of the lecture was Aristotle’s claim that a happy and successful life presupposes the cultivation of one’s own virtues - such as fairness and courage:
I totally agree 47,
I agree to some extent 51,
I disagree to some extent 5,
I totally disagree 2,
I don’t know 1.   (Total no of answers : 106)

The Socratic principles of ‘Think for yourself’ and ‘Know thyself’ are:
Very important 151,
Important to some extent 34,
Not really important 1,
I don’t know 0.    ( Total no. of answers: 186)

Thoughts are power but also traps. A key claim of the lecture was that only some of your own thoughts are really your own thoughts. However, your acts are influenced by your thoughts even when you haven’t scrutinised those thoughts in any critical way. This perspective was:
Enlightening 39,
Enlightening and challenging 114,
Enlightening, challenging and even revolutionary 11,
Not really important 12,
I don’t know 1.   (Total no of answers: 117)

Fundamental virtues in ancient Greece were wisdom, prudence, courage and fairness. I am interested in nurturing these virtues in my own life:
Very much 99,
To some extent 79,
Hardly at all 2,
I don’t know 4.   (Total no. of answers : 184)

General comments:
‘I could not expect modern philosophy to be so interesting and thought provoking’
‘The lecturer was inspiring and skilfully made things understandable. The personal examples were enlightening and created a feeling of intimacy.’
‘The course was inspiring and full of material for personal growth and personal thinking, i.e. Aristotle’s eudaimonia, the role of concepts in thinking, Christian values vs. self improvement and the worlds deviation from my own experience.’
‘Esa Saarinen is an excellent lecturer. By coming forward with his whole personality the occasions were not merely lectures but strong experiences.’
‘It is great to see that somebody really has thought about pedagogy, the interaction and the embodiment of the points of the lecture’
‘The course was very interesting and opened new points of view to my everyday thinking.’

Example 2
Most of Saarinen’s Philosophical Lecturing has taken place outside the university setting in organisations, the business world and through public lectures. Saarinen has broken new ground for philosophy in the corporate world. Esa Saarinen - followed by other Finnish philosophers - has established philosophy as a respectable and respected source of insights for the purposes of organisations, businesses and work life. For Nokia, Saarinen has lectured globally. The following is a representative excerpt from the feedback of an open-to-all two-hour lecture at Nokia Mobile Phones, Denmark.

Theme: Work Life Balance.
Rating in terms of Relevance:
Very relevant 50, Relevant 12, Not Relevant 0.

General Rating: very good 50, good 4, poor 7

Comments:
‘Gave some issues to think about in my life’
‘Very useful - mostly for your private life’
‘Illuminating, positive, rewarding, entertaining, worthwhile’
‘It’s good with all the examples’
‘Woke our minds up’
‘Great philosophies to manage life activity’
‘The balance between work and life is very important to everybody. Through these lectures I become aware of the fact that it is very easy to enter ‘auto-pilot’ and therefore very easy not to take the decisions that are most important in your own life’
‘Personal approach, moving without being pushing’.

People often report major and sometimes astonishing changes in their behaviours, everyday conceptualisations and life attitudes as a result of Saarinen’s Philosophical Lectures. A systematic study of such changes, or the factors that trigger it, does not exist at the current time. Our intention is to return to some of the issues involved in a later work.
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